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Abstract: Treves et al. explain the need to preserve the rights of nonhuman species, human
youth, and future generations. Although conservation biology has claimed to have an intrinsic
valuation ethic since its inception in the 1980s, many aspects of the field have taken a decidedly
anthropocentric and instrumentalist trajectory. This has important consequences for
conservation-related policy and practice at all scales: local, regional, and global.
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Conservation biology’s ethical “muddle”. I call myself a conservation biologist, although when
I was in graduate school (late 1980s and early 1990s), there were virtually no university
programs with the word “conservation” in their monikers. Indeed, the journal Conservation
Biology was established only in 1986 and nonprofits that explicitly included “conservation” in
their names only sprang forth in that same decade or thereabouts (e.g., Wildlife Conservation
Society). I mention this timeline because in “Just Preservation”, Treves et al. delve to the center
of a moral dilemma (the ethical “muddle”) that conservation biologists have never fully
confronted, although it has been inherent in the discipline since its inception. This ethical
muddle, as described by the authors is that: “conservation biology and its ethics remain
confused about whether we have responsibilities to individual organisms, how we should meet
those responsibilities, and what an inheritance of evolutionary outcomes implies. Nor does
conservation biology emphasis the importance of preserving nature (as opposed to conserving
natural resources) for future generations of humans and non-humans”.
There are good reasons why distilling the normative postulates of conservation biology
has been tricky. The vast majority of conservation biologists (such as myself) are neither
ethicists nor environmental philosophers and thus lack the vocabulary and training to give this
discourse the treatment it deserves. Moreover, the recognition that nonhuman species
have sentience has drawn mainstream attention only recently. Pragmatically (as is made
evident by Treves et al.), explicating the rights and interests of nonhuman species, human
youth and future generations without anthropocentrism is a nontrivial challenge. Yet,
addressing the dissonance inherent in so many conservation discussions in order to “level the
playing field between humans and non-humans” is more than just an academic pursuit. How
scholars and practitioners contend with these ethical concerns has practical implications for
the conservation of nature – implications for both policy and strategy in the field. It was hence
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deeply gratifying to read “Just Preservation”. I applaud the authors for venturing into the
intellectual fray. Few scholars have the training, temerity, and talent to do so as elegantly.
Instrumental versus intrinsic value in conservation. The value of a thing (in this case, “nature”,
“non-human species”, “future generations”, etc.) can be instrumental (utility for humans) or
intrinsic: an objective value, in and of itself. From its inception, conservation has considered
the value of species and habitat to be intrinsic: "Species have value in themselves, a value
neither conferred nor revocable, but springing from a species' long evolutionary heritage and
potential" (Soulé 1985). Yet, intrinsic value is rarely brought into practice at the policy level. As
Treves et al. note: “we find recent interpretations of a non-anthropocentric principle continue
to side-line the well-being of the non-human world and contain a vexing speciesism (creating a
hierarchy of value with humans at the top and justifying human use of individual non-humans as
long as populations, habitats, or ecological assemblages remain apparently unharmed)”.
Despite claims to the contrary, conservation biology has become decidedly instrumental,
assimilating precepts of an earlier anthropocentric and instrumentalist model of natural
systems and their products (such as the timber that forests can provide; Pinchot 1914). The
mission statement of the United States Forest Service (USFS), for example, is to “sustain the
health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of
present and future generations”. That of the US National Park Service (NPS) is “to preserve
unimpaired the natural and cultural resources and values of the National Park System (NPS) for
the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this and future generations”. And that of the US
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is “to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of
public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations”. In each case,
“generations” means human generations, not those of nonhuman species.
The ethical missions of the USFS (1905), NPS (1916), and BLM (1946) were written long
before the advent of contemporary conservation biology and considerations of intrinsic value
and animal sentience, but anthropocentric instrumentalism still prevails globally today. In the
United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2006), the most ambitious attempt
to identify the value of nature, it was categorized in terms of “ecosystem services” – assessing
nature in terms of its benefits to humans. Written by more than 1,300 authors from 95
countries, the MEA represents consensus about the roles and value of the natural world, with
implications for policy and action at an international scale. Fruit-eating, seed-dispersing
animals, for example, are deemed valuable because they facilitate optimal reproduction and
recruitment of trees that yield resources for humans (e.g., timber, food crops) — not because of
the relationships between fruiting plants and fruit-eating animals that have evolved over the
past 65+ million years. It is the fact that these animals provide ecosystem services to humans
that imbues them with instrumental value.
If the natural world is identified by the United Nations as having value only for human
beings, vast elements of our biota will go unnoticed, ineligible for conservation action. Apart
perhaps from the case of pollinating honeybees, never to my knowledge has recognition that an
animal species can provide ecosystem services been based on the value of protecting the
species for its own sake rather than just ours.
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PhD Scholarship in Foundations of Animal Sentience (ASENT)
London School of Economics
The Foundations of Animal Sentience project (ASENT), a five-year ERC-funded project led by
Dr. Jonathan Birch, aims to study the methodological foundations of animal sentience research
and the link between sentience and animal welfare. The project seeks to recruit one PhD student.
The student will contribute to the project either by exploring the methodological foundations of
animal sentience research, or by investigating the pathway from animal sentience research to
consequences for animal welfare legislation and policy and/or animal ethics.
The student, at the time of starting the PhD, should have an excellent undergraduate degree and a
completed Masters degree in philosophy or another relevant subject, such as comparative
psychology, cognitive science, or animal welfare science. The primary supervisor of the PhD
project will be Dr. Jonathan Birch. If you have any questions or want to know more about the
project, please write to Jonathan at j.birch2@lse.ac.uk.
The successful applicant will receive full funding for a 4-year PhD at the LSE, including full
payment of tuition fees AND a maintenance stipend of £18,000 per annum. To apply, please
apply to the MPhil/PhD in Philosophy at the LSE in the usual way, carefully following all the
requirements described on the LSE’s website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-atlse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2020/MPhilPhD-Philosophy. When you apply, please indicate
clearly in your application (in both your Statement of Academic Purpose AND your Research
Proposal) that you wish to be considered for the ASENT scholarship.
You should include, in your research proposal, a substantial description (of at least 1,500
words) of a research project relevant to ASENT. You MAY, if you wish, include TWO
research proposals in the same document: a proposal relevant to ASENT, and a proposal on a
different subject that you would pursue if awarded an LSE Studentship or a LAHP (AHRC)
scholarship. If you do this, please indicate clearly which of the two proposals is relevant to
ASENT.
CLOSING DATE: 24 JANUARY 2020.
It is expected that interviews will be conducted in late January or in February.
www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/asent-scholarship/
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